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I.

INTRODUCTION***

The history of the development of Soviet thought on international
law has been marked by numerous controversies in which the names
of Korovin, Pashukanis, Vyshinsky, and Tunkin figure prominently.' A continuing problem has been the difficulty involved in
the reconciliation of the Marxist theory on the relationship between
the state and social substructure with the reality of the Soviet position in the existing state system of international politics. 2 Despite

the apparent wide divergence of basic viewpoints among Soviet
legal theorists, one can distinguish a certain continuity and consistency, as reflected by the three major themes of Soviet thought on
international law:
a. A duality of social systems. - Behind the facade of international law lie two irreconcilable social systems: the capitalist and
the socialist. These differing social systems produce superstructures of divergent legal norms. The development of general international law poses a problem in this general Marxist approach;
sometimes general international law has been treated as a separate
and virtually autonomous superstructural element.3
b. Extreme emphasis upon state sovereignty. - Strangely enough,
the Soviet Union has usually placed greater emphasis upon sovereignty than have Western states, although the concept of sovereignty in international law was developed by bourgeois legal theor*
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I E. KOROVIN, DAS VOLKERRECHT IN DER UBERGANGSZEIT (1929); SOVIET LEGAL PHILOSOPHY (J.
Hazard ed. 1951); A. VYSHINSKY, VOPROSY MEZDUNARODNOVO PRAVA I MEZDUNARODNOJ POLITIKI
(1949); Tunkin, Co-existence and International Law, 95 RECUEIL DES COURS 1 (1958)
[hereinafter cited as Tunkin].
2 H. KELSEN, THE COMMUNIST THEORY OF LAW 148-92 (1955) [hereinafter cited as KELSEN].
Id. at 169, 191-92.
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ists and is incompatible, at least superficially, with basic Marxist
theory on state and society.4
c.

The primacy of the treaty as a source of internationallaw. -

The emphasis upon the treaty as a source of international law
follows from the concentration upon state sovereignty: international law can be created only by the action of independent state
systems.'
These themes have governed elaboration of the fundamental Soviet approach to international law. Given the divergence between
social systems, there must be a corresponding divergence between
legal systems. This was expressed most clearly by Maxim Litvinoff
to the League of Nations in response to a British delegate's question
as to whether it would be possible to find a single impartial judge
in the whole world. Litvinov replied: "It [is] necessary to face the
fact that there [is] not one world but two-a Soviet world and a
'6
non-Soviet world."
However one explained the mode of development of international
law (and Soviet theorists differed on this), it was necessary to take
into account the reality of antithetical social systems. MarxistLeninist theory of social development was crucial to theorizing
about international law, just as it was with regard to domestic legal
structures. Whether or not general international law was regarded
as a separate superstructural element, the milieu for the development of international law was a fundamental legal dualism. Ultimately, Marxist-Leninists foresaw a world existing under a single
legal framework that would reflect the substructural unity of the
victorious proletariat; international law could only be regarded as
provisional and transitional. Soviet legal theory thus posited a dichotomy between an existential legal dualism and a teleological
legal monism.
Soviet legal theorists have recently moved away from this framework toward what might be called an incorporative view of international law. There can no longer be a rigid compartmentalization
between international and domestic law, since the objective interests of the socialist system require that, in some respects, domestic
and international legal norms be identical. This view reflects in part
the strategic necessities dictating "peaceful coexistence" and it con' W.
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tinues trends initiated under Khrushchev. It also reflects the developmental crisis of the socialist system and the resulting major revision of Soviet development theory. Here the practical problem has
concerned the incorporation of the "new type of international relations" existing within the socialist commonwealth into a broader
framework of international law.
In terms of the three major themes mentioned above, the new
approach involves a continuing insistence upon the primacy of the
treaty, a reinterpretation of sovereignty doctrines, and a reassessment of the relationship between the major social systems.
II.

SYSTEM LAW AND INTERNATIONAL LAW

The 1957 Declaration of the Twelve Communist Parties in Power7
included the following statement:
The Socialist countries base their relations on principles of complete equality, respect for territorial integrity, state independence
and sovereignty and noninterference in one another's affairs. These
are vital principles. However, they do not exhaust the essence of
relations between them. Fraternal mutual aid is part and parcel
of these relations. This aid is a striking expression of Socialist
internationalism .8
Although the concept of "socialist internationalism" was to become the basis for the later Soviet reinterpretation of sovereignty
doctrines, this statement clearly affirmed the Soviet adherence to
the legal recognition of state sovereignty, a position formally indistinguishable from that of "bourgeois international law." Moreover,
Soviet practice during the 1950's exhibited a marked emphasis upon
recognition of state sovereignty, as reflected in the networks of bilateral treaties set up during that decade9 and, more significantly, in
the unanimity rule adopted for the Council for Mutual Economic
0
Assistance (COMECON).
A major departure was signaled by the Soviet proposal in 1962
that the Executive Committee of COMECON be accorded suprana7 MEETING OF REPRESENTATIVES

OF THE COMMUNIST AND WORKERS' PARTIES OF SOCIALIST

(1957).
1 Id. at 13; cf. Khrushchev, For New Victories in the World Communist Movement,
KOMMUNIST, Jan. 1961, at 34.
1 See generally Cary, Patternsof Soviet Treaty-making Behavior with other Communist
COUNTRIES, DECLARATION

Party-States, in COMMUNIST PARTY STATES: COMPARATIVE AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES 135-59

(J. Triska ed. 1969).
10 See generally Finley, A PoliticalPerspective of Economic Relations in the Communist
Camp, 17 W. POL. Q. 294 (1964).
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tional authority over the economic relations of the member states."
This proposal was defeated and the Soviet Union had to accept a
lesser goal, the granting of supranational status to Intermetall, a
subordinate body of COMECON. For a time thereafter the Soviets
reverted to their emphasis upon bilateral agreements among system
members and in 1965 fully yielded to the Romanian position concerning state sovereignty within the system, a position that was
consistent with Soviet sovereignty doctrine, but was not in accord
with Soviet political objectives. 2
The invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, after some initial confusion and hesitation, inspired a Soviet reinterpretation of sovereignty
within the system, an aim already adumbrated in the 1962 proposals
on COMECON. The invasion was a clear violation of international
law under both the socialist and bourgeois versions. The Soviets had
been able to claim in 1956 that the intervention in Hungary was a
response to the invitation of elements within the Hungarian
Government and thus preserve intact their formal adherence to
state sovereignty; no such explanation was available in 1968. In
these circumstances it was impossible to maintain the theretofore
orthodox doctrine of state sovereignty. Not surprisingly, the Soviets
put forward the position that the duality of social systems takes
precedence over formal sovereignty.
S. Kovalev, a Soviet jurist, advanced this argument in his September 1968 Pravda article that initiated the so-called "Brezhnev
Doctrine": "Under the Marxist concept of legal norms, including
those governing relations among socialist countries, they cannot be
interpreted in a narrow formalistic sense, outside the general con3
text of the class struggle in the contemporary world.'
Kovalev maintained further that in a class society there is no such
thing as nonclass law and legal norms must be subordinated to the
laws of class struggle and social development. To emphasize "legalistic considerations" at the expense of the socialist viewpoint is to
use bourgeois law as a "measuring stick."
According to Kovalev, achievement of "the imperialist goal of
detachment of Czechoslovakia from the socialist commonwealth"' 4
would have contradicted the right of the Czechoslovak people to
" See, e.g., Zybenko, The Economic Problems of COMECONIntegration,2 STUDIES ON THE
SoviEr UNION, No. 4 at 60 (1963).
2 Zorza, Reorganization Plan for Warsaw Pact, Manchester Guardian, Sept. 16, 1965, at
8.
Pravda, Sept. 26, 1968, at 4, col. 2.
11Id. at col. 7.
13
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"socialist self-determination";' 5 the destruction of socialism would
be followed by the loss of national independence. The intervention
by the five socialist states was, said Kovalev, a fight for Czechoslovakia's sovereignty against those "who would like to take away this
sovereignty by handing over the country to the imperialists."'"
Leonid Brezhnev, in his November 12, 1968, Warsaw speech,"
completed the outline of what was to become known as the Brezhnev Doctrine and affirmed the position taken by Kovalev concerning
sovereignty:
Socialist states stand for strict respect for the sovereignty of all
countries. We resolutely oppose interference in the affairs of any
states and the violation of their sovereignty.
At the same time, affirmation and defense of the sovereignty of
states that have taken the path of socialist construction are of
special significance to us Communists. The forces of imperialism
and reaction are seeking to deprive the people first in one, then
another socialist country of the sovereign right they have earned
to ensure prosperity for their country and well-being and happiness
for the broad working masses
by building a society free from all
8
oppression and exploitation.'
The pronouncements of Kovalev and Brezhnev were widely
viewed in the West as the initiation of a Soviet doctrine of "limited
sovereignty," with the Soviet Union allegedly reserving the right to
intervene in other socialist countries, if necessary, to preserve socialism.'" However, the Soviets made no claim to a right of unilateral
intervention; any threat to a socialist regime was seen as a problem
for the system as a whole, which required a systemic response. Further, it would appear that the Brezhnev Doctrine can be viewed best
not in terms of a limitation of sovereignty, but rather in terms of a
redefinition of sovereignty.
Kovalev and Brezhnev did not deny the continuing viability of
the previous Soviet position regarding state sovereignty. However,
that position now appeared restricted to "bourgeois international
law"; a different definition of sovereignty applied in the countries
Is Id.
"

Id.

Address by Leonid Brezhnev, Nov. 12, 1968, in Pravda, Nov. 13, 1968, at 2, col. 2. The
speech is also quoted in 20 CURRENT DIG. OF THE SovIEr PRESS, Dec. 4, 1968, at 3.
"
"

References cited note 17 supra.

* Ionescu, Le Nationalisme en Europe de l'Est, in LEs
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223 (J. Lukaszewski ed. 1970); cf. Davletshin, Limited Sovereignty: The Soviet Claim
to Intervene in the Defense of Socialism, 16 BULL. OF THE INST. FOR THE STUDY OF THE USSR,
August 1969, at 3, 3-9.
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that had taken the "socialist path of development." Here the exercise of sovereignty was a prerogative reserved exclusively for the
proletariat, which means, of course, for the vanguard, the Communist Party. The substructural class development takes precedence
over the superstructural formal legal development. However, the
traditional conception of sovereignty continued to apply in relations
among the bourgeois countries and in relations between the bourgeois countries and the socialist system. If the socialist conception
of sovereignty negated the recognition of state autonomy within the
socialist system, then essentially the socialist system was being removed from the structural framework of international law, for the
Soviets had consistently refused to credit nontreaty sources of international law. Yet, in practice, the Soviets continued to operate
within the framework of formal state relations previously existing
among the countries of the socialist commonwealth. The result was
a large measure of unresolved ambiguity.
This ambiguity was relieved somewhat by the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Aid between the Soviet Union and
Czechoslovakia"0 signed in Prague on May 6, 1970, and the subsequent Soviet interpretation of its significance for international law.
The preamble of the Treaty contains this statement: "[T]he support, strengthening and defence of the socialist gains achieved at the
cost of the heroic efforts and selfless labour of each people are the
common internationalist duty of the socialist countries .
"2
Article 1 of the Treaty points to "the principles of socialist internationalism" as the basis for the relations between the Soviet Union
and Czechoslovakia. Article 5 spells this out in greater detail:
The High Contracting Parties, expressing their unswerving determination to proceed along the path of the construction of socialism
and communism, will take the necessary steps to defend the socialist gains of the peoples and the security and independence of the
two countries, will strive to develop all-round relations among the
States of the socialist commonwealth, and will act in a spirit of the
consolidation of the unity, friendship and fraternity of these
22
States.
0. Khlestov, a Soviet spokesman, assessed the significance of the
Treaty for international law as follows: "The main principle determining the relations between socialist countries is the principle of
20

Done May 6, 1970, J.

(1974).
2 Id. preamble.
22 Id. art. 5.

GRENVILLE, THE MAJOR INTERNATIONAL TREATIES

1914-1973, at 374
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socialist internationalism. This is now not only a political principle,
but also a principle of international law." 23
After pointing out that general international law contains imperative principles and rules which states cannot evade, regardless of
their social systems, 4 Khlestov discussed the relationship between
socialist international law and general international law:
The principles and rules of international law which regulate relations between socialist states go beyond general international law
and contain new principles besides general-democratic ones. They
have this special feature determined by the similar-type state system of the socialist countries, their common ideology, common
interests in safeguarding their revolutionary gains and national
independence against encroachments by the imperialist camp, and
unity of purpose-the building of communism. These common
socio-economic and political features create an objective basis for
sound and friendly interstate relations in the socialist community.
This gives rise to the creation of a new-socialist-international
law whose task is to define relations between socialist countries.
Like general international law, the relations between socialist
countries develop their own imperative principles and rules, according to which in their relations with each other socialist countries must not act otherwise than as these imperative principles
and rules prescribe. 5
Thus socialist international law is seen as not being inconsistent
with general international law and is considered to some extent an
extension of general international law. However, the basic Soviet
position on the principles and rules of general international law (at
least where such principles and rules are recognized both by bourgeois states and by the socialist countries) is that such principles
and rules derive from treaty formulation among states." Khlestov's
analysis implies that the principles and rules of socialist international law are something akin to the Western conception of sociological jurisprudence-they are derived from the "living law" norms of
the new socialist societies. Nevertheless, the recognized norms of
socialist international law are reducible to the concept of "socialist
internationalism," and "socialist internationalism" was not
claimed to be a "principle of international law" until the signing of
the Soviet-Czechoslovak Treaty. Moreover, Khlestov explicitly recKhlestov, New Soviet-Czechoslovak Treaty, INT'L AFF. (Moscow), July 1970, at 9, 12
[hereinafter cited as Khlestov].
24 Id.
2

n

Id. at 13.
TRISKA & SLUSSER, supra note 5, at 26.
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ognizes the state system of the socialist countries as the structural
framework for relations under this new socialist international law.
It thus appears that the Treaty is a milestone in the progressive
development of socialist international law. That development, like
the development of general international law, is dependent upon
agreements between states. The new definition of sovereignty becomes legally valid upon acceptance by state systems; that new
definition is inherent in the concept of "socialist internationalism."
Formal acceptance of "socialist internationalism" by state systems
means incorporation of the concept into a broader framework of
international law.
III.

PROLETARIAN INTERNATIONALISM AND SOCIALIST
INTERNATIONALISM

The 1961 Soviet textbook on international law contained this
statement: "[I]n the course of the co-operation between the socialist States the foundations of a new International Law are being laid,
of which proletarian internationalism is the guiding principle." 7
Proletarian internationalism has been defined by A. Cunhal in
World Marxist Review as follows:
Proletarian internationalism comprises three basic principles:
(1) unity and solidarity of the workers of all countries, including-as a key element-the unity and solidarity of the socialist
countries; (2) recognition of the right of nations to selfdetermination and independence, envisaging their increasing
closeness based on the identity of the interests of working people;
and (3) priority in relation to particular and short-range interests
of the common and international interests of the socialist revolution. 8
Socialist internationalism, now claimed to be a part of international law, is supposedly a subcategory of proletarian internationalism. It pertains to the "international relations of a new type" that
have arisen because of the existence of the socialist system and
defines the norms of relations among socialist states.2 9 Socialist internationalism has usually been defined in such ambiguous terms
U.S.S.R., SOVIET TEXTBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL LAW 20 (1961).
Cunhal, ProletarianInternationalism-A Policy and Outlook, 13 WORLD MARXIST REV.,
May 1970, at 70, 71.
2S See Tasks at the present stage of the struggle against imperialism and united action of
the Communist and Workers' Partiesand all anti-imperialistforces, 12 WORLD MARXIST REV.,
July 1969, at 5, 14; cf. Selyaninov, ProletarianInternationalismand the Socialist State, INT'L
AFF. (Moscow), Nov. 1969, at 10, 12.
"
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an "fraternal mutual aid"; however, in the usage of Kovalev and
Brezhnev, it specifically means, among other things, that each socialist state owes obligations to the socialist commonwealth which
transcend the formal independence of the individual states.
The formulation of Kovalev and Brezhnev is thus contradictory
to the norm of self-determination and independence set out by Cunhal in his definition of proletarian internationalism, insofar as the
latter is a restatement of the previous Soviet position on state sovereignty. The leaders of several nonruling Communist parties, who
subscribed to proletarian internationalism and whose political position domestically required them to make the strongest defense of
national sovereignty, were quick to point out the contradiction in
1968, following the invasion of Czechoslovakia. A more significant
contradiction concerns the types of behavior to which the concepts
refer: socialist internationalism pertains to the behavior of states in
a regional state system; proletarian internationalism pertains to the
behavior of the world proletariat and proletarian parties, presumably in opposition to the existing state system, notwithstanding the
stated defense of national independence.
Both the initial pronouncements on the Brezhnev Doctrine and
subsequent Soviet statements indicate a narrowing of the concept
of socialist internationalism, a preference for that concept over proletarian internationalism, and a down-grading and de-emphasis of
the latter. Since November 1968, it appears that the concept of
proletarian internationalism has been employed by Soviet spokesmen mainly as a limited instrumental device, providing a useful
counterpoise to bourgeois challenges concerning sovereignty doctrines." However, socialist internationalism has become more and
more the crucial keystone of socialist international law.
Given the basic incompatibility between these two allegedly complementary concepts, the fact that the earlier emphasis upon
prolitarian internationalism as the "guiding principle" of Socialist
international law has been displaced by exclusive concentration
upon socialist internationalism assumes special significance. The
claim that socialist internationalism, as reinterpreted by Kovalev
and Brezhnev, is now part of the broader framework of international
law involves a posited incorporation of political relations existing
within a regional state system into a legal system transcending the
underlying social bases. Thus compatibility of this approach with
the heretofore orthodox viewpoint on the duality of social systems
is obviously most tenuous. However, from the technical viewpoint,
' See Fedoseyev, Marxism and Internationalism,INT'L AFF. (Moscow), Mar. 1969, at 3, 8.
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the new approach involves legal dualism on two levels: (1) a functional division and distribution of sovereignty among states of the
socialist system; and (2) a recognition of two different definitions of
sovereignty, one for general and bourgeois international law, the
other for socialist international law.
IV.

INTERNATIONAL LAW AND IDEOLOGY

The current Soviet attitude toward international law reflects in
large measure the thought of Professor G. I. Tunkin, the leading
Soviet writer on international law, relative to the law of peaceful
coexistence . 3 However, in the 1950's, Tunkin rejected the idea of the
division of international law into different regional systems.2 The
subsequent development of legal relations among states of the
socialist commonwealth did constitute formation of a different regional system. Beginning in 1968, Soviet spokesmen based socialist
international law primarily upon the revised formulation of socialist
internationalism. Since basic principles of general international
law include national sovereignty, the equality of all states, territorial integrity, and noninterference with the internal system of other
states, 33 the new interpretation of socialist international law
clearly is violative of accepted principles of general international
law. Yet the claim was made that socialist internationalism is not
only compatible with general international law, but is in effect an
extension of it. 34 This could only mean that socialist international
law is being incorporated into general international law, that general international law is changing, and that Soviet influence is decisive in its reformulation. This approach shifts the emphasis from
Tunkin's previous position on "diametrically opposed systems" and
35
his treatment of general international law as a separate category.
Professor Tunkin's new theoretical orientation involves a reevaluation of the relationship between international law and ideology.
Tunkin wrote in November 1971:
International law does not rest on any community of ideologies
and is not an expression of any such community. There is evidence
that the antithesis between . . . them [is] no insuperable barrier
See Tunkin, supra note 1.
FRIEDMANN, supra note 4, at 330.
3 Id. at 331.
3
Khlestov, supra note 23, at 13; Selyaninov, Consolidation of the Socialist Community,
INT'L AFF. (Moscow), Oct. 1970, at 10, 11.
See generally G. TUNKIN, OSNOVY SOVREMENNOGO MEZHDUNARODNOGO PRAVA (1956); G.
31
32

TUNKIN, PRO1LEMY MEZHDUNARODNOGO PRAVA (1961).
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to the development of international law. What is more, it is in the
postwar period-one of especially acute struggle between socialist
and bourgeois ideologies-that there has been a much faster development of international law than at any time in the past.3"

Further, Tunkin maintained: "[ildeological issues are not subject
to agreement and are merely incidental to the formulation of inter37
national law rules.
Tunkin's analysis up to this point is entirely consistent with his
previous position on general international law as a separate category, and is also consistent with the formulation advanced by both
Khrushchev and Brezhnev that peaceful coexistence does not extend to ideology. 38 However, the thrust of Tunkin's argument shifts
somewhat when he discusses the penetration of domestic and regional legal systems by progressively developing general international law.
According to Tunkin, concepts such as "justice," "social advancement," and "democratic development" are accepted in general international law, and inclusion of these concepts results from adherence to such documents as the United Nations Charter. 39 Agreements upon application of these concepts lack the specificity of
agreements related to peaceful coexistence. Among the more significant treaties in this area, Tunkin lists the 1958 Geneva Conventions
on marine law, 0 the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations,4' the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 2 the
3' Tunkin, InternationalLaw and Ideological Struggle, INT'L AFF. (Moscow), Nov. 1971, at
25, 26 [hereinafter cited as Tunkin, InternationalLaw]; see Kulski, Soviet Comments on
International Law, 45 AM. J. INT'L L. 762 (1951). Kulski offers a possible explanation for
renewed emphasis on international law: "The postwar cultural isolationism towards the West
and a specifically Soviet complex of inferiority inherited from the early years of the regime
have produced since the last war an attitude of self-assertion." Id. at 762.
" Tunkin, International Law, supra note 36, at 26.
18Address by Leonid Breshnev, International Parties Congress, June 7, 1969, in Pravda,
June 8, 1969, at 4, col. 3 [hereinafter cited as Breshnev Address]; cf. Editorial, Educate
Active Builders of Communism, KOMMUNIST, August 1974, at 13, 13-24.
"' Tunkin, InternationalLaw, supra note 36, at 27.
'" Convention on the High Seas, April 29, 1958, [19621 2 U.S.T. 2312, T.I.A.S. No. 5200,
450 U.N.T.S. 82 (effective for United States Sept. 30, 1962); Convention on the Continental
Shelf, April 29, 1958, [1964] 1 U.S.T. 471, T.I.A.S. No. 5578, 499 U.N.T.S. 311 (effective
for United States June 10, 1964); Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone,
April 29, 1958, [1964] 2 U.S.T. 1606, T.I.A.S. No. 5639, 516 U.N.T.S. 205 (effective for
United States Sept. 10, 1964); Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources of the High Seas, April 29, 1958, [1966] 1 U.S.T. 138, T.I.A.S. No. 5969, 559
U.N.T.S. 285 (effective for United States March 20, 1966).
" April 18, 1961, [1972] 3 U.S.T. 3227, T.I.A.S. No. 7502, 500 U.N.T.S. 95 (effective for
United States Dec. 13, 1972).
" Opened for signature May 23, 1969, UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON THE LAW OF TREATIES, OFFICIAL RECORDS 289, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.39/27 (1971).
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1963 Moscow treaty against nuclear tests in three environments,43
the non-proliferation treaty," and the 1967 treaty on outer space.45
Here there is a direct impact upon domestic systems although, according to Tunkin, this is still unrelated to ideology:
When international law rules are formulated, specifically during
the conclusion of international treaties, it is not a matter of agreement on ideological questions but of coordination of rules governing the behavior of states. Thus, the conclusion of the nonproliferation treaty entailed the formulation of rules governing the
behavior of states in possession of nuclear weapons, and of states
not in possession of such weapons."
In all of this Tunkin sees an increasingly progressive reorientation
of international law, a reorientation in which the Soviet Union has
played a major role. Against Western charges that the Soviet Union
did not in the past accept general international law, Tunkin maintains that "the Soviet state did not reject international law but
merely opposed its reactionary institutions." 7
This progressive reorientation of international law within the milieu of hostile social systems leads Tunkin to the conclusion that
general international law is related to ideology only in a negative
way, and that the ideological struggle is a subject of regulation in
international law. According to Tunkin, international legal rules
bind the states "to use in the ideological struggle in international
affairs only those means allowed by international law . . .,,"
Tunkin has thus moved from a view of the mutual exclusiveness
of ideology and international law to a position acknowledging the
subordination of ideology to general international law. Ideology reflects the underlying social reality and is thus the basis for the
fundamental duality of social systems. Tunkin seems to be saying
that the world legal superstructure is no longer a separate element
but is in some respects at least dominant over the social substructure. This idea had been adumbrated earlier by the Soviet jurist,
A. Bramson:
,1Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under
Water, Aug. 5, 1963, [1963] 2 U.S.T. 1313, T.I.A.S. No. 5433, 480 U.N.T.S. 43 (effective for
United States Oct. 10, 1963).
" Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, July 1, 1968, [19701 1 U.S.T. 483,
T.I.A.S. No. 6839 (effective for United States Mar. 5, 1970).
" Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of
Outer Space, Including the Moon and other Celestial Bodies, Jan. 27, 1967, [1967] 3 U.S.T.
2410, T.I.A.S. No. 6347, 610 U.N.T.S. 205 (effective for United States Oct. 10, 1967).
" Tunkin, International Law, supra note 36, at 26.
, Id. at 29.
Id. at 27.
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In considering relations between states, the Soviet Union must
keep in mind the interests of the working-class, and this first fact
must be borne in mind in connection with the possibility of cooperation between the Soviet Union and the capitalistic states.
The political and social systems of bourgeois states, though severely criticized by the Soviet Union, remains their internal affair.
The basic principle of the Soviet conception of international law
is that of state sovereignty which may only be limited by obligations freely accepted."9
According to Tunkin, the subordination of the social substructure
becomes more explicit and presumably reflects official Soviet attitudes. This is surprising indeed and cannot be explained by reference to the strategic necessities of peaceful coexistence, since the
Soviets have consistently maintained that peaceful coexistence does
not preclude the ideological struggle. This conclusion does not appear surprising, however, when account is taken of the developmental crisis of the socialist system and the resulting reinterpretation
of the Marxist-Leninist theory of social development. Indeed, what
is called here the Soviet incorporative approach to international law
appears to be a direct outgrowth of this revision of Soviet practice
and theory.
V.

THE DEVELOPMENTAL CRISIS OF THE SOCIALIST SYSTEM AND
CHANGING SOVIET ATTITUDES TOWARD INTERNATIONAL LAW

The formulations of Kovalev, Khlestov, and Tunkin all relate to
the developmental crisis of the socialist system. Movement from the
traditional duality of systems employed by Kovalev to the incorporative approaches of Khlestov and Tunkin reflects an attempt to
utilize international law as a structural support for the measures
required by this developmental crisis. The resulting theoretical reformulation represents a de-emphasis of functional development
and a tendency toward a view of superstructural autonomy. In other
words, law is regarded in Marxism-Leninism as part of the social
superstructure; if the superstructure is no longer a variable functionally dependent upon the social substructure, then a new relationship between system superstructural elements and nonsystem
superstructural elements is possible and indeed may be necessary.
This is the theoretical basis for the current Soviet incorporative
approach to international law.
The original Soviet emphasis upon sovereignty was directly related to the problem of "capitalist encirclement." State sovereignty
" Bramson, Soviet Conception of InternationalLaw, 1 PANSTWO
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was strongly emphasized because of the perilous position of the first
socialist state in a world dominated by capitalism; general observance of sovereignty was a guarantee against outside interference vis-vis the Soviet Union.50 However, in 1959 Khrushchev declared
that "capitalist encirclement" had ended for the Soviet Union; 5 a
year later the Declaration of the 81 Parties declared that the "other
socialist countries as well" had been secured against this threat and
that restoration of capitalism had become "socially and economically impossible."5 2 Thereafter, the contours of the systemic crisis
became apparent. Already, in 1962, the Soviet supernational proposals for COMECON were a response to problems of cohesion related to uneven development. The Czechoslovak episode of 1968 led
to formulation of the Brezhnev Doctrine and the reassessment of the
relationship between social systems under circumstances of the intensifying systemic crisis of development.
Crucial to the Soviet theoretical response to the developmental
crisis are the identification of "difficulties," i.e., the contradictions
of socialism, and the concept of the "weakest link of socialism."
According to Brezhnev and other Soviet spokesmen, the balance of
forces in the world has changed decisively to favor the socialist
system; it is no longer possible for the capitalists to seek to alleviate
the contradictions of imperialism by resort to force against the socialist system. As the contradictions of the capitalist system increase in the era of imperialism, the capitalists become more and
more desperate and must adopt more subtle tactics of ideological
subversion, variously described by Soviet spokesmen as "peaceful
infiltration," "peaceful counterrevolution," and "creeping counterrevolution." Such tactics are feasible because socialist development
is uneven, producing "weak links." These tactics are employed
against the "weakest link of socialism" and are aimed toward bourgeois restoration. If successful, this would result in "reversing the
course of history."53 Such a capitalist offensive is feasible (though
the outcome is presumably in doubt) even "after creation of the
foundations of socialist society." 54
Brezhnev's prescription for the crisis produced by the weakening
supra note 2, at 149-50.
Pravda, Jan. 28, 1959, at 9.
52 THE NEW COMMUNIST MANIFESTO 19 (D. Jacobs ed. 1961).
Brezhnev Address, supra note 38, at 1-4; see Oleinik, Leninism and the International
Significance of the Experience Gained in Socialist Construction, INT'L AFF. (Moscow), Feb.Mar. 1970, at 27, 27-34 [hereinafter cited as Oleinik]; Sovetov, The Present Stage in the
Struggle Between Socialism and Imperialism, INT'L AFF. (Moscow), Nov. 1968, at 3.
1,Oleinik, supra note 53, at 30.
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of links is four-fold: (1) increasing coordination of the activities of
the socialist countries in all fields;55 (2) strengthening of the role of
the Communist Party throughout the system; (3) an intensification
of ideological warfare against bourgeois ideology; and (4) application of coercion to meet immediate crises caused by "weakening of
links." This coercion, sanctioned by "socialist internationalism," is
to be coordinated on an international or interparty basis within the
socialist commonwealth; strengthening of the commonwealth's primary coercive arm, the Warsaw Treaty Organization. 6
The current Soviet position on the "weakening of links" recalls
Stalin's claim that contradictions increase during the building of
socialism. However, Stalin's view on increasing contradictions was
directly related both to "capitalist encirclement" and to the primitive level of socialist development. Neither of these considerations
applies today. The 1959 and 1960 proclamations concerning the end
of "capitalist encirclement" have never been disavowed; the contemporary pzoblems identified by Brezhnev and other Soviet
spokesmen appear at an advanced stage of socialist development.
Identification of Czechoslovakia in 1968 as the "weakest link of
socialism" means that contradictions are no longer correlated with
levels of socioeconomic development; Czechoslovakia had been consistently recognized as the most advanced country of the socialist
system other than the Soviet Union.5 7 Contradictions reappear at an
advanced stage of socialist development and, in a practical sense,
level of development now becomes primarily a matter of degree of
integration into the socialist system for the Soviet leadership.
The Soviet theoretical response to the developmental crisis has
been an admission of the separation of superstructure and substructure at advanced levels of socialist development; the practical response has been the strengthening of the superstructure. Given the
fundamental weakness of the socialist system implicit in the developmental analysis of the Brezhnev Doctrine, incorporation of socialist international law into a broader international law framework
becomes a matter of necessity not from the standpoint of physical
survival in the nuclear age but rather from the standpoint of survival of the Soviet social system in a period when functional development no longer determines the outcome of history. Thus a "convergence" between the legal superstructures of the two conflicting
Brezhnev Address, supra note 38, at 2, col. 1.
Editorial, In Defense of Socialism and Peace, INT'L AFF. (Moscow), Sept. 1968, at 3, 5.
'7 Sik, The Economic Impact of Stalinism, 20 PROBLEMS OF COMMUNISM, May-June 1971,
at 1, 2.
"

GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L.

[VOL. 6:227

social systems can be regarded as an aid to the survival of the
embattled socialist superstructure.
Kovalev's redefinition of sovereignty for the states of the socialist
commonwealth, Khlestov's view on the incorporation of socialist
internationalism into international law, and Tunkin's assertions
concerning the prohibition in international law of certain forms of
ideological struggle are all in accord with the above analysis. When
account is taken of the fact that Soviet legal theorists contend that
the Warsaw Treaty Organization is sanctioned by general international law58 (specifically, by the UN Charter),5" while at the same
time they maintain that agreements between bourgeois and socialist
states reflect the "diplomatic struggle of the two worlds," 0 the pattern becomes clearer still. Development of international law on communications is a specific example of this diplomatic struggle between the two worlds: the Soviets advocate an extension of international law in this area and explicitly admit that this is motivated
by concern for the ideological dangers inherent in unrestricted telecasting across national frontiers.6"
The new Soviet incorporative attitude toward international law
thus involves a breakdown of boundaries among general international law, bourgeois international law, and socialist international
law; ironically, however, the new approach is designed to strengthen boundary maintenance of the Soviet social system. This is,
of course, essentially the same motivation that caused the Soviets
during the Stalinist era to emphasize sovereignty more strongly
than did the bourgeois states. However, the "new type of international relations" within the socialist commonwealth and the de-velopmental problems of the system make the former approach to
sovereignty inadequate. The conflict between the two major social
systems continues but the dualism of legal superstructures is now
incompatible with the dualism of social systems.
VI.

DItTENTE AND THE CONFERENCE ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION

IN EUROPE

Soviet policy toward the West during the 1970's has been consis9.

5'Matveyev, Socialism Holds the HistoricInitiative, INT'L
59 See

AFF.

(Moscow), Oct. 1970, at 7,

U.N. CHARTER art. 52, para. 1.
" Sanakoyev, Socialist Foreign Policy: Coordination and Effectiveness, INT'L AFF. (Moscow), June 1971, at 8, 10. See also Kapchenko, Socialist Foreign Policy and the Restructuring
of InternationalRelations, INT'L AFF. (Moscow), April 1975, at 1, 8.
,1Kolosov, Some Urgent Problems of Space Law, INT'L AFF. (Moscow), Sept. 1970, at 24,
25-26.
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tently directed toward implementation of the incorporative approach to international law discussed above. Between 1968 and
1973, the "socialist camp," particularly the Soviet Union itself,
faced crises of both legitimacy and effectiveness. Brezhnev's diplomacy has reflected an almost obsessive desire for agreements with
the West that would serve to legitimize and stabilize existing sociopolitical relationships within the "socialist camp."
The agreements on Berlin and the status of Germany at the outset
of the decade that "normalized" the situation in central Europe fit
this pattern. So too, do the various "d6tente" agreements with the
United States since 1972, significantly ascribed by Soviet spokesmen to their camp's success in the "diplomatic struggle of the two
worlds." Here the Soviets have resisted even minimal breaches in
their uncompromising position on sovereignty in such matters as onsite inspection of missile bases." They have also adamantly refused
to modify their internal social system as a quid pro quo for American
concessions on trade and technology; e.g., the Soviet Union has
explicitly rejected the Western position on the general legal principle of free emigration of persons. As Soviet dissidents such as Andrei
Sakharov have pointed out, one profound effect of "d6tente" has
been the implicit sanctioning of those repressive features of the
Soviet system that underlie the politico-legal conception of "socialist internationalism." 3
The clearest example of Soviet success in the incorporation of
their politico-legal conceptions into general international law has
been the Soviet adherence to the Universal Copyright Convention. 4
The Soviet Union subscribed to the Convention in May 1973.11 In
September 1973, a Soviet copyright agency was set up to regulate
publication of the works of Soviet writers in the West. Unauthorized
publication makes the Soviet writer subject to prosecution in the
Soviet Union; if the author denies responsibility, the Soviet government may take legal action against the Western publishers. According to Soviet spokesmen, accession to the Convention makes it pos2 See, e.g., Treaty on the Limitation of Antiballistic Missile Systems, May 26, 1972, art.
12, [1972] 4 U.S.T. 3435, T.I.A.S. No. 7503 (effective for United States Oct. 3, 1972); Interim
Agreement on Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, May 26, 1972, art. 5, [1972] 4 U.S.T.
3462, T.I.A.S. No. 7504 (effective for United States Oct. 3, 1972).
" Editorial, Sakharov: This, Not That, N.Y. Times, Sept. 12, 1973, at 47, col. 2.
" Sept. 6, 1952, [1955] 3 U.S.T. 2731, T.I.A.S. No. 3324, 216 U.N.T.S. 132 (effective for
United States Sept. 16, 1955).
11Id. The Soviet Union is party to the Convention only and is not party to the three
protocols annexed thereto.
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sible to "prevent the exploitation of Soviet literary works for antiSoviet purposes.""6
Soviet policy-makers have clearly regarded the Conference on
Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) as the capstone of the
diplomatic drive for incorporation of Soviet legal conceptions into
general international law. While the Final Act of CSCE17 is not a
treaty with the force of law, it undoubtedly has important ramifications in both theory and practice for international relations and law.
And although the Soviets were obliged to make some terminological
concessions to both their Eastern allies and Western states, they
apparently in the main obtained what they had wanted, especially
in "Basket One""8 of the Final Act. The provision concerning inviolability of frontiers except in cases of peaceful change means that the
35 states represented at the July-August 1975 Helsinki "summit"
have agreed upon both de facto and de jure recognition of communist domination of Eastern Europe and Soviet hegemony over the
area. Notably, "Basket One" has the effect of validating the 1940
absorption of the Baltic States by the Soviet Union, an action
which, if carried out today, would be violative of the CSCE accord
and which in 1940 was incompatible with both Western and Soviet
conceptions of sovereignty. In a practical sense, of course, Western
negotiators have simply recognized a fait accompli that cannot be
undone; implicitly, however, the Western states have yielded to the
Soviet projection of "socialist internationalism" as a legal concept.
Furthermore, most Western observers have viewed "Basket Three" '69
of the Final Act, which deals with travel, information, and culture,
as heavily weighted in favor of the Soviets.
It thus appears that the new Soviet incorporative approach to
international law has assumed a position of great practical importance in contemporary international relations. Doubtlessly due to
favorable changes in the "world correlation of forces," the Soviet
Union has moved far toward achievement of the aim outlined above:
legitimation of the social substructure of the "socialist camp" by the
legal superstructure of general international law.
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